Contrary to the 23 July 1952 Revolution which went down in history as a white revolution, the 25 January 2011 Revolution will go down as a red, bloody one. This is bound to anger many
Contrary to the 23 July 1952 Revolution which went down in history as a white revolution, the 25 January 2011 Revolution will go down as a red, bloody one. This is bound to anger many Egyptians, but the fact remains that the 1952 Revolution was bloodless and almost victimless, while the 2011 Revolution saw the fall of thousands of victims and injured.
The violence started with the resistance of the previous regime and its security apparatus to the revolution, in a desperate attempt to abort it. In the process violent acts took place, and the Interior Ministry withdrew its security forces, leading to the security lapse which followed. Later, fierce conflicts arose between the revolutionaries and the Islamists who desired to confiscate the revolution to their own account.
In the wake of 25 January 2011 Revolution, political Islamic movements made a comeback following years of oppression, imprisonment, and exclusion from the political field at the hands of the previous regime. It was expected that this comeback should see the Islamists join forces with the revolutionaries and the other forces on the Egyptian political field to make a success out of the revolution. Egypt was looking forward to a future based on freedom, democracy, equality and citizenship rights; and it was not expected that the movements which specifically suffered from exclusion in pre-revolution times should inflict it upon the others. On the ground, however, this proved not true. Since the first moments the Islamist made an appearance on the streets and squares, and ever since their presence became a reality on the political scene, it was obvious they were elbowing their way to the front lines, pushing all others into the shadow. Their huge appetite for devouring the revolution was all-too-evident; they attributed to themselves its success, excluding the young people who spearheaded it. The Islamists embarked on their project to hijack the revolution and exploit it to their own ends, to serve their acknowledged or hidden agendas and strategies.
The revolutionaries could not miss the Islamist intentions but, even though they expressed their wariness, the lack of sound leadership and a well-defined policy rendered them incapable of defending their revolution. The revolutionary spontaneity and innocence was lost to the fierce, superbly-organised political Islam.
A quick glance at the series of events since 25 January 2011 sufficiently demonstrates how the revolution was lost to the Islamists: The consecutive Friday mobilisation of Islamists to converge onto the public squares in towns all over Egypt in order to monopolise the political address. The attack against the Israeli embassy last September; and the successive blowing up of the gas line to Israel—it was blown up some 14 times since 25 January 2011. The clashes for no clear reason between the young people on one side and the military and the security forces on the other at Qasr al-Aini and Mohamed Mahmoud Streets. The demonstrations in front of the Cabinet headquarters and the torching of the venerable Institut d’Egypte. The belligerence of Islamist presidential candidates and their blatant threats that “matters will not pass peacefully” if Hazem Abu-Ismail—who was legally disqualified from running—does not get back into the presidential race. The most recent blow was the catastrophic march by the Islamists against the Defence Ministry in Abassiya, Cairo last Friday, raising the black Islamist banners with the sword of Islam and calling for jihad. The aim was to bring down the State and foster civil war; the outcome was a battle in which the military emerged victorious.
The Islamists were playing with fire; most Egyptians saw the Abassiya incident as a realisation of the popular: “If I’m not in, I’ll finish it off.” Concerned citizens saw no reasonable justification for the Islamist aggression. The Islamists demanded that the military hand over power to a civil authority but, the closer this came to realisation the more violently they set it back. They alleged remnants of the previous regime worked to turn peaceful demonstrations into bloodbaths, but the Islamists created the pretext for these bloodbaths, then looked on as though intoxicated at the sight of the spilt blood, the resultant anarchy, and the obstruction of power hand-over.
Amid this dismal scene, and despite efforts in the direction of democracy and freedom, drafting a new constitution for Egypt and electing a new president, is it any surprise that I received not a few messages that cried: “Why don’t the military seize power and rescue Egypt?”
WATANI International
13 May 2012