The current fighting in the Gaza Strip raises again, in an acute but familiar form, the agonizing question: Whatkind of accommodation is possible, if ever, between Israel and theArabs? For a long time it was generally assumed, in the region and elsewhere, that peace was impossible, and that the Arabs## struggle against Israelwould continue until they achieved their aim of destroying the Jewishstate. Meanwhile, Israel could survive and even serve a useful purposeas the one licensed grievance in the various Arab dictatorships, providing a relatively harmless outlet for resentment and anger thatmight otherwise be directed inward. In this phase, the only peace thatcould be expected was the peace of the grave. The more recent history of the Middle East shows a significant changeand, notably, two possible paths toward peace. One of them is limitedand therefore more feasible; the other is comprehensive and thereforeremote and problematic. One approach to peace is exemplified by the policies of Anwar Sadat,president of Egypt until his assassination in 1981. He sought peaceand publicly declared his willingness even to goto Jerusalem. Sadat did not take these measures because he was suddenlypersuaded of the merits of Zionism. His reason was more practical andimmediate — his awareness, shared by a growingnumber of his compatriots, that Egypt was rapidly becoming a Soviet colony. Already the Soviet presence in Egypt was more widespread and moreobtrusive than the British had been. Sadat##s Peace Initiative:Sadat realized that, on the best estimate of Israel##s power and the worst estimate of its intentions, Israel was far less a danger toEgypt than the Soviet Union was. He therefore decided on hisepoch-making peace initiative. Despite many difficulties, the 1979 peace accord signed by Egypt and Israel has endured ever since – at best cool, sometimes frosty, butpreserved for the mutual advantage of both sides. It was even extendedwith the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in1994 and informal dialogue between Israel and some Arab governments. In Iran, Sadat##s murderer is venerated as a hero of Islam, and a street in Tehran is named after him. In several Arab countries at thepresent time, and in wider Arab circles, there is a growing perceptionthat once again they face a danger more deadly and menacing than Israel at its worst: the threat of militant, radical Shiite Islam,directed from Iran. Double Threat:This is seen as a double threat. Iran, a non-Arab state with a long and ancient imperial tradition, seeks to extend its rule across theArab lands toward the Mediterranean. And it is an attempt to arouseand empower the Shiite populations in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulfand other Arabian states, long subject to Sunni domination. Iraniantentacles are spreading westward into Iraq and beyond by the northernroute into Syria and Lebanon and by the southern route to thePalestine territories, notably Gaza. This double threat, of Iranian empire and Shiite revolution, is seenby many Arabs, and more particularly by their leaders, as constitutinga greater threat than Israel could ever pose — a threat to their verysocieties, their very identity. And some Arab rulers are reacting the same way that Sadat did to the Soviet threat, by looking toward Israelfor a possible accommodation. During the war in Lebanon in 2006 between Israel and theIranian-supported Shiite militia Hezbollah, the usual Arabsupport forthe Arab side in a conflict was strikingly absent. It was clear thatsome Arab governments and Arab peoples were hoping for an Israelivictory, which did not materialize. Their disappointment was palpable. Arabs and Hamas:We see similar ambiguities over the situation in Gaza. On the one hand, pan-Arab loyalty demands support for Gaza, under whatever typeof Arab rule, against the encroaching Israelis. On the other, many seethe Gaza enclave – ruled by Hamas, a Sunni group but increasingly controlled by Iran — as a mortal threat to the Sunni Arabestablishment all round. In this situation, it is not impossible that some consensus willemerge, along the lines of Sadat##s accommodation with Israel, for themaintenance of the status quo. Such a peace, like that between Egyptand Israel, would be at best cool, and always threatened by radicalforces both inside and outside. But it would certainly be better thana state of war, and it could last a long time. Signs of Democracy: The second hope for change would be the growth of real democracy in the Arab world. Though unlikely at the present time, there are signsthat such a development is not impossible. Some Arabs have even been willing to speak out and welcome Israel as apioneer of democracy in the region, a model that could help them to develop their own democratic institutions.Some have drawn attention to the fact that the at-times-disprivileged Arab minority in the state of Israel enjoys greater freedom of complaint anddissent than any group in any Arab country. A striking example is thecurrent wave of protests among Israeli Arabs against the Israeli action inGaza; open, outspoken — and unpunished. This does not go unnoticed. The expression in Arab countries of any opinions favorable to Israelis unpopular, even dangerous, and sometimes fatal. The extent to whichsuch opinions are held is therefore problematic,to say the least. But there are clear indications that they exist, andsome have been willing to risk their lives in order to express them. Ifthey increase and lead to acceptance and cooperation between the twosides, the Middle East might once again resume its place, which it enjoyedin both ancient and medieval times, as a major center of civilization. Outside Powers:In the past, any assessment of the prospects for peace in the regionwould have assigned a major, perhaps decisive, role to outside powers.This is not true today. The U.S., no longer confronting thechallenge of a global rival, and amply provided with cheap oil, is unlikely to involve itself in the messy politics of the region.Russia, no longer resigned to being marginalized, has resumed somerole in the Middle East. But it remains minor, and Russia is seriouslyimpeded by its own Islamic problems at home. In earlier times one would have assigned a major role to Europe, but at the present day what matters is not so much the European role inthe Middle East as the Middle Eastern role in Europe. A prominentSyrian intellectual recently remarked that the most important question about the future of Europe is: Will it be an Islamized Europe, or aEuropeanized Islam? The possibility remains that there will be no peace — in which casethe most likely outcome for the region as a whole is a descent intochaos and mutual destruction, perhaps by that time involving anIslamized Europe, and leaving the future of the world to be shared or contested between Asia and America. _______________________________________________________________ Bernard Lewis is professor emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. He is co-author, with Buntzie Ellis Churchill,of “Islam: The Religion and the People” (2008). His 30 books have been translated into more than two dozenlanguages including Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Indonesian. Hiscontribution to the understanding of Middle Eastern history has beenrecognized by the 15 universities that have awarded him honorary doctorates. Bloomberg News.