WATANI International
13 December 2009
“Sectarian Violence … Causes and Effects” was the title of a recent seminar held in Cairo by Egyptians against Religious Discrimination (MARED).
The seminar began with an opening message delivered by Samer Soliman, professor of political science at the American University in Cairo. Dr Soliman recalled that sectarian violence had been steadily escalating in Egypt throughout the last decades; from verbal to physical abuse, from specific areas to all over Egypt, and from religious extremists to mainstream Egyptians. Sectarian violence, Dr Soliman said, was the epitome of religious discrimination, and hence the reason behind the establishment of MARED.
The seeds and the fruits
The first speaker was Emad Gad of the al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Dr Gad objected to the term ‘sectarian violence’, since the violence, he said, was not due to sectarian but to religious reasons. It was just another aspect of rooting religion as a basis for everything in the public domain, he insists; a phenomenon which the ruling regime had succeeded in instituting.
Dr Gad, however, drew attention to the fact that ‘religionising’ Egyptian society went back to the years of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who was president of Egypt from 1953 to 1970. For purely political purposes, Nasser advanced the religious perspective through Islamising school curricula and promoting a religious address in the media. This was why, Dr Gad explained, Nasser was frequently credited with sowing the seeds of sectarianism. But, he said, it was left to the following Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat to nurture and nourish them onto an abundant harvest. Sadat opened the door wide to the political Islamic current in the hope that it would oust the Nasserist and leftist movements which so opposed him, but he fell victim to the Islamists—they assassinated him in October 1981—and left us a legacy of extremist political movements which appeared all but impossible to contain.
Sole defender
It was Sadat, Dr Gad reminded his audience, who instated the second article in Egypt’s Constitution, which reads: “Egypt is an Islamic country, and sharia (Islamic jurisdiction) is the main source of legislation”. And it was Sadat who described himself as “A Muslim president of a Muslim State” and Egypt as the “State of knowledge and faith”. He considered Pope Shenouda III his enemy and dealt with incidents of violence against Copts from a sectarian, fanatic perspective at a time when Egypt was in dire need of a non-sectarian, non-fanatic leader.
To make matters worse, the open economy endorsed in the Sadat years following years of socialist economy under Nasser left many unemployed. Dr Gad explained how thousands left for the Gulf states, where a booming oil economy beckoned, only to come back home with a culture that further promoted religiosity. And to appease this culture, the ruling regime adopted a strategy of tightening licences to build churches.
The Coptic Church, Dr Gad said, was thus left as the sole defender of citizenship rights and the sole promoter of citizenship concepts on the Egyptian arena.
When al-Azhar, the topmost Islamic Sunni authority, presented a bill to the Egyptian parliament in 1977 calling for the implementation of hodoud—the Islamic penalties against crime, including cutting off a thief’s hand, stoning an adulterer, and executing anyone who converted from Islam—the Coptic Church did not take it quietly. An extensive meeting of Coptic clergy issued a statement outlining Coptic grievances and calling for freedom of belief, abolishing restrictions to building churches, exempting Christians from having to comply with sharia rulings, equal opportunity, fair representation in legislative councils, allowing Christian publications or banning publications that insulted Christianity, including Coptic history in school curricula, and protecting Christian families.
Religiosity takes over
According to Dr Gad, the Mubarak years heralded in a more moderate regime. Among other things, President Mubarak reinstated Pope Shenouda III as head of the Coptic Church after Sadat had ordered him confined to a desert monastery and stripped him of his civil authority as head of the Church. In 2003, Mubarak stipulated that Coptic Christmas day be a national holiday. Efforts were made to regain the citizenship concepts which had been lost during the Sadat years. But the damage had already been done, and fanaticism had become too entrenched, even in State apparatuses such as the security apparatus. Especially in Upper Egypt, Dr Gad pointed out, where Copts were numerous and prosperous, Islamists were strong and unemployment rampant, fanaticism thrived.
The result is that we now suffer from an all-too-predictable sectarianism, and our political leadership appears lacking in a comprehensive vision of how to put an end to it.
We have reached the point, Dr Gad said, where attacks against Copts are frequent; Islamisation and religiosity dominate all aspects of life including business, medicine, and sports; the hijab has given way to the niqab; Christians feel severely alienated; belonging is no longer to the Egyptian homeland but to the Islamic umma (nation).
Monopolising the truth
Following Dr Gad’s historical perspective of the causes of sectarian violence, the audience was treated to a psychological perspective presented by Ismail Youssef, professor of psychiatry at Suez Canal University. Dr Youssef explained the root of fanaticism as the firm belief in possessing a monopoly over the truth. This, he said, logically extended to a monopoly over virtue which, naturally, the ‘other’ could not posses. Monopoly over truth and virtue practically banished the other; fanaticism, rejection and violence naturally followed. Fanaticism wiped out critical thinking where the ‘other’ was concerned.
Green light to violence
From the cause, the seminar moved on to the effect of sectarian violence. Focusing on the ‘reconciliation sessions’ so frequently used to resolve sectarian incidents, lawyer and rights activist Medhat Murad looked at the history of these sessions where the victims and attackers were brought together in the presence of the village elders and, in modern times, local politicians or police officers, and a reconciliation worked out. These sessions which relied heavily on sharia to exact justice, Mr Murad said, were instrumental in resolving problems in rural or Bedouin communities.
The problem with reconciliation sessions in case of sectarian violence, Mr Murad said, was that the attacker was not penalised nor was the victim redeemed. Copts complained that they were just coerced into sitting down with their attackers and made to reconcile, thus foregoing all their legal rights. The law was simply set aside.
For his part, MARED member Nagi Artin said he believed the security apparatus was fully to blame for the prevalent sectarian tension and ensuing violence. He claimed that security officials fell short of their role of catching the culprits and furnishing proof of their guilt. He said that Copts felt the security apparatus had been Islamised and that security officials were constantly biased against them in favour of the Islamists. This, Artin said, gave fanatics a green light to carry out their crimes against Copts.
The final comment came from Mounir Megahed, coordinator-general of MARED, who wondered out loud what made a Muslim who lived peacefully and compassionately with his Coptic neighbour turn against him and attack him and his property? Indeed, answering this may offer a key to solving the problem.