No matter what turn the political events in Egypt take, the pivotal issue today is the writing of the new constitution.
No matter what turn the political events in Egypt take; be they related to the performance of the new president, the appointment of his aides, the assignment of a new Cabinet, or even the disastrous security breakdown; the pivotal issue in Egypt today is the writing of the new constitution. For Egyptians, this should be the mother of all battles, lest we wake up one day to find out that the country has retreated from the 21st century into the Middle Ages, back to the Islamic Caliphate the Islamists are so brazenly demanding.
It is thus of prime importance to follow closely the controversy over the new constitution, especially where the first, second, and third articles are concerned—articles that tackle the identity of Egypt.
In parallel to the work of the constituent assembly that is now in the process of writing a new constitution for Egypt, keen efforts are being made by various national groups to crystallise a distinct vision of the Egyptian identity. This vision is formulated in constitutional clauses which should for generations to come govern the constitutional and legislative course Egypt would follow.
I was drawn to a pamphlet printed by the United Group, under the title Proposed constitutional texts – Articles 1 & 2 of the new constitution. The work, which was introduced by the activist and political researcher Nigad al-Borai, is the fruit of round-table discussions among an elite group of Egyptian intellectuals, politicians, and many who are genuinely concerned about the homeland; who insist that specific sectors of Egyptians are excluded out of several domains, and warn that this may give rise to dire consequences. The result is a worthy set of ideas on defining the cultural, geographic, and religious identity of Egypt, and codifying this definition in the new constitution.
The pamphlet printed the Al-Azhar Document which was issued by the venerable, moderate Islamic institution of al-Azhar together with a number of Egyptian cultural figures in June 2011, and tackled the future of Egypt on the freedoms and rights front. At one point the Egyptian political arena was rife with talk that the Al-Azhar Document, together with the Document of the Democratic Coalition for the Sake of Egypt, would be used by the constituent assembly as bases for drafting the constitution. Yet what we see now is one attempt after the other by the assembly to turn its back on the two documents.
Among the most significant points cited in the pamphlet are:
• The first article of the constitutional declaration issued by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which was taken from the 1971 Constitution, stipulates that: “The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic State founded upon citizenship. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and work to achieve its full unity.” The second article stipulates that: “Islam is the religion of the State, Arabic its official language, and the principles of Islamic sharia the main source of legislation.”
• In the wake of the 25 January Revolution in 2011, the freedom to found political parties was instated, Islamist prisoners were released, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed broad freedom to operate on the political field. Voices calling for the legislative Islamisation of the Egyptian State gained force, which led to burgeoning fears among Egyptian religious and ethnic minorities who started questioning the identity of the State they lived under. Was that State one for all Egyptians, or was it exclusively Muslim? It did not help that SCAF had handed the task of amending the constitution and a number of related legislation to a commission of competent scholars, but whose chief and several members of which had obvious Islamist leanings; the matter raised fears for Egypt’s future.
• The March 2011 public referendum on the proposed constitutional amendments was supposedly a political, legal exercise. It disclosed, however, that there were forces in Egypt who unabashedly desired to re-form the political future of the country after the model of neighbouring countries which were more like Islamic emirates than modern States. The public was mobilised to vote in the referendum basing on fanatic defence of Islamism; mosques were exploited to depict the referendum as a vote on Islam in Egypt.
The round-table opened for discussion five questions relevant to the first and second articles of the constitution:
1. Is it essential to cite Egypt as an Arab country? Might this clause be changed to the wider “Egypt is an African, or Afro-Asian, country” in order that the distinction should be based on geographic location and not on common language?
2. Why the clause that Egyptians should work to achieve full Arab unity? Does this have any bearing on the identity of the State, or is it a mere political standpoint that needs not be included in the constitution?
3. Is it of any importance that the State, a legal personality, should belong to any religion? To what extent does this serve to persuade non-Muslims that they are excluded? What clauses or phrases need to be added to make all Egyptians feel included into the State institution not left out of it?
4. Is it adequate to substitute “the intents of Islamic sharia are the main source of legislation” for “the principles of Islamic sharia are the main source of legislation”?
5. How expedient is it to add a clause to Article 2 to indicate the constitution respects all religions and faiths embraced by the citizens of Egypt?
I leave the reader to give serious thought to these five questions, to make up his or her own mind, before I cite what the round-table meeting had to say to them.
WATANI International
5 August 2012