It is no secret that the situation in Lebanon is disastrous, now that its political, economic, social and living conditions are unprecedentedly abysmal. The fate of those still living in Lebanon hinges on the gruesome political settling of accounts that has long fragmented the nation. I say “those still living in Lebanon” because sadly, during the past few years, large numbers of competent, well-educated Lebanese businessmen and professionals have left their country once and for all. Lebanon was drained of its middle class which represent the core of its society and the dynamo of its economy. Members of the Lebanese middle class fled upon losing all sense of security and stability brought on by the persistent political conflict which shattered the nation. Lebanon’s political forces are divided according to tribal and clannish loyalties, political parties, or even loyalty to other countries; their primary concern being not Lebanon as a nation or State, but securing a part of the Lebanese political cake according to the quota system. The result was that the middle class managed to save their skin by transferring —or smuggling—their wealth outside the country, and fleeing. Left behind are the helpless Lebanese who could not flee; they remain home to struggle with declining living conditions, runaway inflation, and grave scarcity in basic commodities and power supply. Also remaining are the political tycoons who possess huge wealth and armed militias; they remain to contend a share in the quota of the political cake. As to the Lebanese army, it stands helpless before the political strife.
Lebanon’s gruesome domestic discord has been left to exacerbate and fester for long years, much earlier than the huge explosion at Beirut Port in August 2020; the blast was not the cause for the country’s devastated situation. Yet I believed, together with many others, that the port explosion which left 177 dead, 6000 injured, an estimated 300,000 people homeless, and property damaged to the tune of USD10–15 billion, would serve as a crucial wake up call to the country’s political forces, and get them to engage in salvaging the nation and the State. Sadly, no such thing materialised, and no amount of effort—even that led by France which has remained closely connected to Lebanon after the latter gained its independence from the French mandate in the 1940s—was able to rectify the situation for Lebanon.
A few weeks after the explosion, I wrote about Lebanon’s labour pains, highlighting the protest on the Lebanese street. I wrote: “The Lebanese people are there, albeit fragmented, confused and powerless to do anything but protest in wrath and frustration, rejecting the current state of affairs and demanding full change. The motherland is there too, rooted in the land, its history and identity, yet shattered and torn among factions whose sole concern is to divide the cake, Lebanon in its entirety, among them on sectarian basis. For the last 50 years they never ceased fighting over division and redivision of the cake to reallocate the shares. In the process, they perfectly exploited sectarianism, ethnic differences, tribal and clan dominions, geographical divisions and military militias. What motherland can survive this? Again I pose the question of where is Lebanon the State?”
I was hoping that the harsh experience would bring Lebanon to labour, giving birth to a new strong Lebanon, moving it from fragmentation to a new reality where nation and State reign supreme. I closely observed the scene yet, barely a month later, I was again disappointed. In September 2020, I wrote under the title “Lebanon: Still on old ground”, that in the wake of the explosion and the street protests, Lebanon was on the verge of a political void since the government had resigned and parliament disintegrated, and many political blocs left the scene. This looked like the perfect opportunity to reshape the political map to strike a balance between the Lebanese people’s aspirations for a citizenship-based constitution, and the requirements of the quota system.
The first test was the selection of a new prime minister, but the tug of war selection process dissipated all hopes for change. Following seemingly endless pushing, pulling, indecision, and delay, Mustafa Adib was selected as PM, unanimously approved by all political blocs and forces since he fulfilled the main criterion of the quota system by being a Sunni Muslim. The quota status extended to the division of all State posts on sectarian basis; this included ministers, military posts, representatives of electoral constituencies, judges, heads of governmental circuits, ambassadors and university professors. This is how deeply cancerous sectarianism runs in the body of the Lebanese State, depriving it of the very rudiments of a “State” and enrooting in its stead tribal measures. It became obvious to me then that Lebanon was still on its old ground.
Today, 18 months later, nothing calls for hope to see Lebanon rise up from its political stumble or its economic and societal crises. It is true that the media has heralded news of plans by the World Bank and a number of countries, among them Egypt, to pump life into the sector of electricity and power. But will these plans pull Lebanon and its people—those who remain on its land—out of the pitfall?
Watani International
18 February 2022